Agricultural Labor Party proposal: It is proposed to drastically reduce the current subsidy standard for new energy vehicles

The two National Conferences will be held soon. The Central Party of Agriculture and Industry intends to submit the proposal of the first session of the thirteenth session of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on "Proposals on Perfecting the Government's Subsidy Policy for China's New Energy Vehicle Industry" (hereinafter referred to as the "Proposal"), including the evaluation of the current implementation of the capital subsidy. Adjustment. The current financial subsidies have achieved great industry-improving effects. In the future, they can seek ways other than financial subsidies, such as tax deductions for increasing R&D expenses, government procurement, and directional rate-cutting loans, which are relatively soft and have less impact on market supply and demand. The way. Given that the subsidy standard before 2020 has been locked, subsidy standards can be greatly reduced through temporary adjustments, especially the more controversial subsidy standards for passenger cars and special vehicles.

Suggestions on Perfecting the Government Subsidy Policy for China's New Energy Automobile Industry

Agricultural and Labour Party Central

In recent years, China's new energy automotive industry has achieved rapid development and is inextricably linked to the leverage of government subsidies. Direct, huge, and sustained subsidies have also resulted in large gaps between production and sales data and actual use data, car companies' fraudulent subsidies, and interference with market supply and demand, and disruption of fair competition.

First, the existing subsidy rules only focus on formally legitimacy. New energy auto manufacturers must obtain sales results before they receive subsidy funds, and then report them to the appropriate regulatory authorities for approval. Will the government's involvement in industrial development interfere with market supply and demand and undermine fairness? There are no forward-looking considerations such as competition. In some places, companies are required to register locally, and in some places, mandatory hybrid vehicles are excluded and only pure electric vehicles are subsidized. This selective subsidy policy has an impact on the market competition order.

Second, the formulation of rules on subsidy objects, standards, and conditions does not have sufficient openness in the process. In advance, there were no procedures such as hearings, solicitation of industry associations, enterprises, and public opinions. Nor did the company establish similar procedures for important effects such as the actual effects of subsidies, adjustment methods, and timely adjustments. As a result, the subsidy rules were difficult to form social consensus, and fraudulent recruitment occurred. The problem also caused the community to question the necessity of subsidies.

Third, subsidies lack the support and coordination of other public policies. Subsidies have a great incentive effect on producers, but they have limited incentive effects on the consumer market. In particular, the construction and management of charging stations and charging piles are far behind. In addition, some first-tier cities that implement automobile purchase restrictions and restrictions on the use of new energy vehicles have passed licensing. Without tilsing or bidding auctions, such methods will force consumers to buy new energy vehicles.

Fourth, the huge subsidies objectively stimulated the fraudulent behavior of car companies. There is a huge gap between the production and sales data reported by enterprises and used for statistical subsidies and the actual data used by consumers. The relevant departments are accustomed to adopting general inspections, penalties, and criticisms, and fail to take effective measures to address the special nature of new energy auto companies' fraudulent subsidies.

Suggest:

First, the subsidy policy for new energy vehicles will be included in major administrative decision-making matters to be regulated. In accordance with the Interim Regulations on Major Administrative Decision-making Procedures to be promulgated by the State Council, strict implementation of corresponding decision-making procedures will be implemented to implement specific rules such as decision-making motions, decision-making, public participation, expert argumentation, risk assessment, legitimacy review, and collective discussion decisions. . The allocation, use, and supervision of subsidy funds shall be carried out in strict accordance with the provisions of China's "Budget Law." For the formulation of subsidy rules and the use of subsidy funds, the role of the People's Congress oversight should be strengthened.

Second, assess and adjust the current implementation of capital subsidies. The current financial subsidies have achieved great industry-improving effects. In the future, they can seek ways other than capital subsidies, such as tax deductions for increasing R&D expenses, government procurement, targeted rate-cutting loans, etc., which are relatively soft and have less impact on market supply and demand. The way. Given that the subsidy standard before 2020 has been locked, subsidy standards can be significantly reduced through temporary adjustments, especially for controversial buses and special vehicles.

Third, conduct neutral competition review of the subsidy rules. In this review, it was clarified that subsidies should be performance- and technology-oriented rather than the place of registration and corresponding local tax contribution considerations; avoidance of selectivity and incline in the determination of subsidies and the criteria, scope and conditions of subsidies; must be established In the process of subsidy rules, democratic factors such as argumentation, hearings, and opinion solicitation are integrated into the process, and the authoritativeness of the main body of the review is ensured. The current internal review of the government is lack of extensiveness and openness, and the review and judicial review of the People's Congress should be strengthened.

Fourth, to promote synergy between subsidies and other public policies. Subsidies should be substantially transferred to the construction of infrastructure such as charging stations and charging piles. We will adjust public policies such as "no need for a shake" or "unlimited" to promote the purchase of new energy vehicles. Fifth, optimize the performance evaluation and adjustment of subsidies, exit mechanism, and strictly punish fraudulent behavior. Add independent and explicit performance assessment procedures and guidelines to specific subsidy rules. First, on the basis of the internal performance evaluation of the government and the review of the legitimacy of the use of funds, an external review and rationality review mechanism was added. It can be entrusted by a professional third party at all levels of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress.

Secondly, to increase the transparency of the adjustment and withdrawal rules for subsidies, so that companies, consumers, and the general public understand that subsidies are conditional, and that they are based on a long-term, phased policy for specific industrial goals and eco-environmental goals. Third, investigate and punish acts of fraudulent supplementation, investigate the civil, administrative and even criminal responsibilities of the verified units and individuals in strict accordance with the law; strengthen the deterrent power through the “blacklist system” (industry access restrictions for a certain period of time or even lifetime).

Proposed contractor: Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology